I was designing and implementing my own IP protocol suite from scratch (in assembly language of course). This was the classic, non-bandwidth flooding, denial of service attack.

If a significant number of spoofed SYN packets arrive within a short time, the TCP server's ability to accept new connections even legitimate connections will be exhausted and the server's services will be denied. Such packets lead a TCP server to believe that valid connections are being requested, and usually cause it to allocate local 'connection resources' such as buffer space and connection management tables. Any TCP server that accepts client connections can be vulnerable to deliberately fraudulent spoofed SYN packets. The problem I faced was of receiving unsolicited connections from TCP clients. I named the build-my-own-packet system NanoProbe (see that link for the whole story) and the remote client IP authentication system RSVP (see that link for that whole story). Since then, both of those systems have been developed, at least partially deployed, and in continuous use. 'by hand', and accept inbound connections from a companion second-generation remote IP authenticating client. Page Updated: at 15:16 (5,300.03 days ago)ĭuring early August of 2000, I was faced with a significant problem : I wanted to create a second-generation port probing facility by creating my own packets from scratch, i.e. Gibson's ENcryption-Enhanced Spoofing Immunity System

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